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Abstract 
Effective interaction between climate science and policy is important for moving 
climate negotiations forward to reach an ambitious global climate change deal. 
Lack of progress in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) negotiations during recent years is a good reason for taking a closer 
look at the process of climate science–policy interaction to identify and eliminate 
existing shortcomings hindering climate policymaking. This paper examines the 
current state of climate science–policy interaction and suggests ways to integrate 
scientific input into the UNFCCC process more effectively. Suggestions relate to 
improvement in institutional structures, processes and procedures of the UNFCCC 
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), quality of scientific 
input, credibility of scientific message and public awareness of climate change. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the first successful decade of UN climate negotiations leading to the conclusion 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its 
Kyoto Protocol, the global community has desperately been looking for ways to 
intensify the negotiating process aimed at striking a succeeding deal, which could 
ensure a safe pace of change in the climate system for future life on the planet. 
International climate negotiations apparently show signs of ossification: policymakers 
seem to have stopped learning from each other, making an agreement impossible.2 In 
this regard, a constant flow of scientific and technical information, with its further 
processing into decisionmaking, is an important aspect of learning in international 
negotiations.3 It is therefore worthwhile to examine the current state of climate 
science–policy interaction and identify issues, which might hamper the effective 
scientific input in climate policymaking required for the attainment of an ambitious 
negotiated outcome. 
                                                 
1 Joëlle de Sépibus is a Senior Researcher and Kateryna Holzer is a Doctoral Fellow with the Swiss 
National Centre for Competence in Research in Trade Regulation (NCCR Trade Regulation) at the 
World Trade Institute, University of Bern.  The authors are grateful to Dannie Jost for valuable 
comments on earlier versions of this paper and Susan Kaplan for editorial assistance. Research for this 
paper was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation under a grant to the NCCR Trade 
Regulation. 
2 Depledge (2006), pp. 2 ff. 
3 Ibid., p. 3. 
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The input of scientific information to climate policy-making is crucial. It was due to 
scientists and their research on climate change that the world community turned its 
attention to the problem of climate change caused by human activities.4 The efforts to 
fight climate change were eventually brought to the international level and culminated 
in the adoption of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 
climate change and the conclusion of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Today, 
scientific research continues to inform international negotiations on the international 
climate regime, as well as national and regional climate policies. 
However, the message that climate scientists send to policymakers is not entirely 
reflected in the policy response. The current international climate regime established 
under the UNFCCC with its normative and policy framework falls far short of 
ensuring the tolerable level of global warming of 2 °C advocated by scientists.5 While 
the discrepancy between the scientific message and the policy response is mainly 
explained by the complexity and high costs of solutions to climate change6, it might 
also be a result of the lack of effectiveness of science–policy interaction. In what 
follows, we will examine the extent to which the deficiency of scientific input is a 
consequence of structural and procedural shortcomings of the IPCC and the UNFCCC, 
as well as some other institutional failures.  
2. Description of the current status 
2.1. Input of science to international climate policymaking  
Climate science played a crucial role in pushing the global community to act on 
climate change. Scientific research, which long preceded the reaction of the 
international community of policymakers, was essentially the first response to climate 
change.7 Research on anthropogenic climate change was first conducted by individual 
scientists, and then taken up by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) established under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN).8  
The UN mandated the IPCC “to provide internationally co-ordinated scientific 
assessments of the magnitude, timing and potential environmental and socio-economic 
impact of climate change and realistic response strategies”.9 In defining the scope of 
its activities, the IPCC commits itself to concentrate inter alia “on actions in support 
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process”.10 
                                                 
4 Epps and Green (2010), pp. 44–45. 
5 Bausch and Mehling (2011), p. 10. The recent climate research signals that the climate change action 
should be stronger and more urgent than has so far been reflected in the Kyoto Protocol and other 
negotiated documents. With the current scale of global action, climate change is approaching an 
increase in temperature of 3.5–6 degrees Celsius by 2035 compared to the safe level of 2 degrees 
Celsius suggested in scientific assessments. See IEA (2011). 
6 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
7 Research in human-induced climate change started in the middle of the twentieth century. In 1957, 
Roger Revelle and Hans Suess from the Scripps Institute of Oceanography in California expressed the 
first scientific concern about the effect of combustion of fossil fuels in human activities on the 
concentration of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere. See Houghton (2009), p. 23. 
8 See UNGA Resolution 43/53 of 6 December 1988. 
9 Ibid., para. 5. 
10 Principles Governing IPCC Work, para. 1. 
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The main outcomes of the IPCC's work are its assessment reports issued with an 
interval of five to seven years. To date the IPCC has produced four assessment reports, 
and the fifth one (AR5) is expected for 2014.11 Importantly, the IPCC does not 
conduct research itself but collects and assesses scientific work on different 
disciplines, which relates to climate change, including social sciences.12 It also 
provides scientific support to the work of the UNFCCC by making available 
methodological information on emissions inventories and other technical issues, which 
is used by governments and is at the core of the international climate regime. 
The IPCC is a unique organization to the extent that it has a scientific as well as a 
political character. While scientists collect and assess scientific information related to 
climate change in assessment reports13, politicians adopt the reports. The main 
decisionmaking body of the IPCC is the panel composed of government delegates,14 
who decide on the content of assessment reports, and approve, adopt and accept 
them.15 Despite the participation of government representatives in its work, the IPCC 
positions itself as a policy neutral organization.16 The IPCC does not give direct 
recommendations for the UNFCCC negotiators. Synthesis reports “address a broad 
range of policy-relevant but policy-neutral questions”, while a summary for 
policymakers, which is usually part of any IPCC report (assessment, special or 
synthesis) “provides a policy-relevant but policy-neutral summary of that Report”.17 
Such a neutral position of IPCC fits the conventional expectation that scientific results 
are impartial with respect to politics and policy.18 
Notwithstanding its non-prescriptive character, IPCC reports have a considerable 
impact on the climate policymaking process.19 The drafting of the UNFCCC was 
largely guided by the information contained in the First Assessment Report released in 
                                                 
11 For a time schedule and details of preparation of the Fifth Assessment Report, see the official website 
of the IPCC at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
12 There are three IPCC Working Groups working on assessment reports in their respective fields of 
climate change-related science. Each Working Group issues an assessment report, which constitutes 
part of the consolidated assessment report. In addition, there are the Task Force on National Greenhouse 
Inventories, which works on developing internationally-accepted methodologies and software for 
calculating and reporting countries’ emissions, and the IPCC Task Group on Data and Scenario Support 
for Impacts and Climate Analysis, which manages the IPCC data supporting the work of international 
scientists. See the IPCC official site at http://www.ipcc.ch/working_groups/working_groups.shtml 
13 Assessment work is done by thousands of scientists from different regions of the world, who work on 
chapters of assessment reports from their country-based offices on a voluntary (i.e. non-paid) basis. 
14 The IPCC is represented by governments of more than 120 countries, which are members of the UN 
and WMO.  
15 Paras. 4.4–4.6 of Appendix A to the Principles Governing IPCC Work: Procedures for the 
Preparation, Review, Acceptance, Adoption, Approval and Publication of IPCC Reports. See also 
WBCSD-Ecofys (2010), p. 41. 
16 Para. 4 of the Principles Governing IPCC Work states: “IPCC reports should be neutral with respect 
to policy, although they may need to deal objectively with scientific, technical and socio-economic 
factors relevant to the application of particular policies”. 
17 Paras. 2 and 4.6.1 of the Procedures for the Preparation, Review, Acceptance, Adoption, Approval 
and Publication of IPCC Reports. It should also be mentioned that IPCC reports do not commission any 
new research either. See WBCSD-Ecofys (2010), p. 41. 
18 On the debate about the appropriateness of advocacy by environmental scientists, see Nelson and 
Vucetich (2009).  
19 Kohler et al. (2012), p. 67. 
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1990.20 Since the conclusion of the UNFCCC, IPCC reports have been an important 
source of information for guiding decisions taken at the UNFCCC. In the current 
climate change negotiations, the Parties recognise the urgency of climate change 
action indicated in the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4).21 A post-Kyoto climate 
treaty to be completed by 2015 would have to take into account the updated IPCC 
assessment of climate science and of climate change impacts. The Durban Platform, 
which launched a process for moving towards a post-Kyoto agreement, states that “an 
agreed outcome with legal force … shall raise the level of ambition and shall be 
informed, inter alia, by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change…”22 The Parties also clearly emphasized the role of the IPCC as a 
source of methodological information.23 
It should be noted that the IPCC is a major but not the only source of scientific 
information for the UNFCCC. Scientific input is also provided by other stakeholders, 
including individual scientists, and business and environmental non-governmental 
organizations (BINGOs and ENGOs).24 For instance, scientists are often included as 
advisors in official delegations of UNFCCC parties to Conferences of the Parties 
(COPs), and science is increasingly used as a basis for forming positions of individual 
countries in climate negotiations).25 Business stakeholders actively participate in 
various COP side events where they communicate their positions, and their role in 
informing the UNFCCC negotiating process is increasing.26 While the input of 
scientists is primarily needed for formulating strategies, the input of business is vital 
for implementing climate policies, especially those related to mobilization of financial 
resources to fight climate change, including investment and technology transfer. Also 
different international organizations (IOs) provide technical information and expertise 
to the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC, for instance, uses UNEP guidelines for reporting on 
                                                 
20 In fact, scientific evidence of climate change as a global phenomenon, provided by the IPCC, was the 
main driving force of the establishment by the UN General Assembly of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee in 1990, which produced the draft framework convention at the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. See Miller (2004), p. 50. It should 
however be noted that this was not the first time in the history of MEAs that scientific research in the 
area had preceded and stimulated international policymaking and action. In this sense, the inception of 
the international climate regime followed the model of the international regime of ozone layer 
protection where scientific work on the problem of the ozone layer preceded the conclusion of the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985 and the Montreal Protocol in 1987. 
See Yamin and Depledge (2004), p. 466. 
21 See the Preamble to the Decision 1/CP.13 on the Bali Action Plan available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3 
22 See para. 6 of the COP 17 Decision on the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 1/CP.17, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf 
23 The Kyoto Protocol endorses use of methodologies “accepted by the IPCC” in Article 3.4 in relation 
to the development of modalities, rules and guidelines for calculating emissions in the land-use change 
sector and forestry, in Article 5.2 in relation to the establishment of national systems of estimation of 
emissions, and in Article 5.3 in relation to the calculation of global warming potential and the carbon 
dioxide equivalence of GHG emissions. Emissions inventory methodologies are developed in the IPCC 
by the IPCC Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. 
24 On the role of different stakeholders in providing scientific input to the UNFCCC, see Lohan (2006), 
pp. 280–290. 
25 On the increasing role of scientists in the formation of the negotiation position of Russia in the 
UNFCCC negotiations, see Andonova and Alexieva (2012 forthcoming), p. 14.  
26 De Sépibus and Holzer (forthcoming).  
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vulnerability and adaptation, and the expertise of the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) on land-use, land-use change and forestry.27  
2.2. The IPCC–UNFCCC interaction process 
Scientific input to an environmental regime is generally supplied through two 
mechanisms: scientific assessments and scientific advice.28 Scientific assessments 
involve the collection, evaluation and synthesis of scientific information and evidence; 
this is usually done by external organizations. Scientific advice consists of science-
based recommendations on various policy issues commonly provided by an internal 
scientific advisory body of a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA).29 In the 
climate regime, scientific assessments are mainly contributed by IPCC, while 
scientific and technical advice on the implementation of the Convention is provided by 
the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), 
which also serves as the main channel for processing IPCC assessments and their 
incorporation into UNFCCC decisions.  
The SBSTA is one of the permanent subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC. It is a political 
body, as it is composed of UNFCCC national delegates negotiating on technical issues 
of climate policy rather than producing or assessing climate science. It is mandated to 
“provide the COP with timely information and advice on scientific and technological 
matters relating to the Convention”.30 Thus, in contrast to the IPCC, the SBSTA is 
authorized to directly advise climate negotiations. The SBSTA obtains scientific 
information from outside (including from IPCC reports) and makes it available for the 
COP decisionmaking process through its session reports, thus serving as a bridge 
between climate science and climate policy.31  
The main interaction between the IPCC and the SBSTA occurs at the stage of defining 
the scope of IPCC reports, when the SBSTA gives its input in defining a set of policy-
relevant questions to be addressed in research assessment.32 The SBSTA is particularly 
involved in defining the content of synthesis reports, which combine the main findings 
of the three Working Groups reports with an emphasis on further application of the 
information to the policy.33 The SBSTA also commissions the IPCC to prepare small 
reports on particular issues of climate change, either already covered by assessment 
reports (technical papers) or totally new ones (special reports). Furthermore, 
representatives of the UNFCCC Secretariat attend IPCC meetings at the invitation of 
IPCC chairs, while IPCC staff attends SBSTA sessions.34 IPCC representatives are 
                                                 
27 Yamin and Depledge (2004), p. 485. Scientific and technological support is also provided by the 
UNFCCC permanent bodies, such as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA), whose role is discussed below.  
28 Glaser and Bates (2011), p. 5. 
29 It should be noted that in some MEAs, scientific assessments are also made by internal technical 
bodies, as is the case of the Scientific Assessment Panel of the Montreal Protocol.  
30 Art. 9.1 of the UNFCCC.  
31 Yamin and Depledge (2004), p. 465. 
32 The IPCC Third Assessment Report was the first one to consider input or requests on structure and 
content from the SBSTA. 
33 Importantly, government delegates attending IPCC plenaries are usually the same people, who work 
in the SBSTA. 
34 Yamin and Depledge (2004), p. 472. 
 7 
regularly invited by the Chair of the SBSTA to speak at its sessions on various 
technical issues,35 and the IPCC chair occasionally speaks at UNFCCC COP sessions 
presenting the latest IPCC reports and participating in question and answer sessions.36 
And what’s more, the UNFCCC as a whole contributes to the IPCC budget together 
with the UNEP and the WMO and in addition to voluntary contributions from its 
member countries.37  
2.3. Criticism of scientific input 
Notwithstanding the long established interaction between climate science and policy, 
there is need for improvement. The IPCC input to the UNFCCC process has recently 
faced a strong wave of criticism, which was provoked by a number of mistakes made 
in AR4 and the assessment process itself. The IPCC, for example, admitted that a 
mistake occurred in the assessment of the rate of melting of Himalayan glaciers by 
Working Group II.38 The IPCC attributed this mistake to “poorly substantiated 
estimates of rate of recession and date for the disappearance of Himalayan glaciers” 
and stated that the mistake happened because “the clear and well-established standards 
of evidence, required by the IPCC procedures, were not applied properly”.39  
Another acknowledged mistake concerns the estimation of the territory of the 
Netherlands that lies under sea level.40 This mistake was eventually corrected by the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, which was the source of the 
information.41 The mistake was blamed on the Dutch Ministry of Transport, which 
confused the figures in the publications used by the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency and eventually by the IPCC Working Group II.42  
These few errors in AR4 were enough to spur a new wave of climate science 
scepticism which had a negative influence on the general motivation and the level of 
ambition at the international climate talks. The scepticism was further fuelled by the 
                                                 
35 It should be noted however that the IPCC representatives never participate in climate negotiations; 
they always adopt a neutral position with regard to politics of climate change. See Yamin and Depledge 
(2004), p. 480. 
36 Lohan (2006), p. 276. 
37 Yamin and Depledge (2004), p. 474. 
38 With a reference to the World Wide Fund for Nature report, which was based on an 
unpublished source, para. 2 of section 10.6.2 of the Working Group II report states:  
“Glaciers in the Himalaya are receding faster than in any other part of the world (see Table 10.9) and, if 
the present rate continues, the likelihood of them disappearing by the year 2035 and perhaps sooner is 
very high if the Earth keeps warming at the current rate. Its total area will likely shrink from the present 
500,000 to 100,000 km2 by the year 2035 (WWF, 2005)”. 
39 See IPCC Statement on the Melting of Himalayan Glaciers of 20 January 2010, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/presentations/himalaya-statement-20january2010.pdf. 
40 The Working Group II report in the 3rd paragraph of section 12.2.3 on current adaptation and 
adaptive capacity in Europe, using the data of the Dutch Environmental Assessment Agency, contains a 
statement that 55% of the territory of the Netherlands lies below sea level, whereas the correct statement 
would be that 55% of the territory is susceptible to floods, as 26% of the territory is below sea level and 
another 29% is susceptible to river flooding. 
41 See “Correction wording flood risks for the Netherlands in IPCC report”, available at 
http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/content/correction-wording-flood-risks. 
42 See http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2672/Wetenschap-
Gezondheid/article/detail/979214/2010/02/20/Onder-waterniveau-maar-de-vraag-is-nog-even-welk-
water.dhtml. 
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leakage of emails from the Climatic Research Unit of the University of East Anglia 
(United Kingdom) in the run-up to the Copenhagen COP in November 2009. The 
private correspondence was taken out of context to accuse scientists of conspiracy. 
Scientists responded to the accusations by giving assurance that “no individual 
scientist in the IPCC assessment process is in a position to change the conclusions, or 
to exclude relevant peer reviewed papers and scientific work from an IPCC 
Assessment Report”.43 
Faced with the criticism, the IPCC needs to learn how to deal with possible mistakes 
and better withstand powerful anti-climate policy propaganda of its opponents.44 To 
this end, in 2010, the IPCC and the UN Secretary General commissioned the 
InterAcademy Council45 to conduct a study on IPCC procedures. On completion of its 
study, the InterAcademy Council produced a report containing important 
recommendations, some of which have already been implemented by the IPCC. 
Building on these recommendations, we will further explore ways to improve the 
climate science–policy interface.  
3. Ways of improving scientific input to the UNFCCC process  
3.1. Guidelines from theory 
There is a substantial body of research on the mutual influences of science and 
governance.46 One of the most influential theories in this field is the theory of co-
production, which is “the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent 
the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose 
to live in it”.47 This theory is particularly relevant for the realm of climate change. The 
interaction of climate science and climate policy is characterized by a long 
evolutionary transformation of the understanding of climate change as a local concern 
to its perception as a global challenge.  
The role of climate science in shaping the perception of climate as a global 
phenomenon and in globalizing climate policy was crucial. Only when scientific 
understanding of climate as long trends in local weather changed in the late 1980s into 
the understanding of climate as a global climate system influenced by world oceans, 
winds, ice caps and other global factors, did changes in climate begin to be presented 
as a global challenge requiring a global policy response. Together with the new 
understanding of climate as a global phenomenon, the new idea about the role and 
                                                 
43 See “Statement by Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on stolen 
emails from the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, United Kingdom” of 
4.12.2009, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/presentations/WGIstatement04122009.pdf 
44 A prominent example of a climate change denial campaign is The Great Global Warming Swindle, a 
documentary issued in the UK in early 2007 featuring interviews with scientists questioning the fact of 
global warming. Most of the scientific evidence presented in the film is either false or outdated. 
Nevertheless, the film has been a powerful tool used by climate sceptics to increase public mistrust in 
climate science and policy. 
45 The InterAcademy Council is an international organization formed by national science academies to 
produce reports on the areas of the global challenges, with recommendations for national governments 
and international organisations. See http://www.interacademycouncil.net/23450/27799.aspx 
46 See, e.g., Jasanoff (2004), Miller (2004), Weichselgartner (2011). 
47 Jasanoff (2004), p. 2. 
 9 
jurisdiction of climate policy-related international institutions emerged.48 As long as 
climate change and its consequences had only a local dimension, there was no 
justification for the creation of an international institution for dealing with the 
challenge.49 However, when the IPCC began to base its assessments of climate on 
global climate models and revealed the global character of climate change, it showed 
the need for the formulation of global climate policy and the creation of an 
international climate change institution for global action on climate change.50  
While co-production of climate science and politics continues, transformation of the 
perception of climate change is not yet finished.  Unfortunately, the process faces the 
barriers of the traditional understanding of state sovereignty and international 
governance represented by nation states.51 A truly global response to climate change 
requires a reconsideration of the concept of sovereignty on the basis of the emerging 
principle of common concern of humankind.52 In accordance with the principle, if 
poor national management of the environment begins to threaten all life on the planet, 
there must be limits to the full jurisdiction of states over exploitation of natural 
resources and all states must contribute to global action against a global challenge. We 
believe that effective interaction between climate science and policy and increased 
input of science to the UNFCCC negotiation process can facilitate the necessary 
transformation in the minds of policymakers.  
3.2. Science–policy interaction in other international regimes 
An examination of science–policy interaction in other international regimes may 
provide important insights on how best to integrate scientific input into policy 
response. The input of science into policy is felt most in MEAs, and the international 
regime of ozone layer protection offers a best practice example in this respect. 
Scientific assessments and scientific advice, along with the availability of 
technological solutions, were crucial for the conclusion of the Montreal Protocol on 
substances that deplete the ozone layer.53 The effectiveness of science–policy 
interaction under the Montreal Protocol is to a large extent attributed to the direct 
participation of scientists in policymaking through scientific and technical assessment 
bodies, which are all part of the structure of the treaty body.54 In the Montreal Protocol 
negotiating process, an internationally recognized group of scientists directly 
participated in negotiations along with government delegates. A remarkable feature of 
the decisionmaking system under the Montreal Protocol is that scientific support is 
incorporated into the decisionmaking structure of the treaty. Technical and scientific 
advice is provided by three technical bodies: the Technical and Economic Assessment 
                                                 
48 Miller (2004), p. 51. 
49 Earlier US National Academy of Sciences reports on climate change concluded that climate change 
poses a risk only for local communities and not for the planet as a whole. See Miller (2004), pp. 52-54. 
50 Some argue that globalization of climate policy has a negative side too. Global response to climate 
change is less concrete than it could have been at the level of local policies. It is also more difficult to 
mobilize resources for addressing a global risk than allocate resources for local needs. See Miller 
(2004), p. 63. 
51 Ibid., p. 63. 
52 Cottier (2012b), pp. 8-13. 
53 Morrisette (1989), p. 812. 
54 WBCSD-Ecofys (2010), pp. 42-43. 
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Panel (TEAP), the Scientific Assessment Panel, and the Environmental Effects 
Assessment Panel.55 The TEAP, for instance, directly advises the Meeting of the 
Parties (MOP) when the MOP takes decisions on the measures under the Protocol, and 
makes suggestions for the future by issuing follow-up reports.56 It makes direct 
recommendations for the parties. Members of the TEAP (22 people representing 
different geographical regions) are representatives of business and academia 
nominated by state parties but acting in their own capacity independent from their 
governments. The work of the TEAP is supported by various task forces of experts 
working on specific technical issues. 
While scientific uncertainty has been a problem in the ozone layer protection regime, 
scientific knowledge about the stratospheric ozone layer has improved over time, and 
based on the updated knowledge, the Montreal Protocol has been amended four times 
since its conclusion.57 Importantly, scientific findings on the links between ozone layer 
depletion and the incidence of skin cancer were particularly crucial for the conclusion 
of the agreement on phasing-out the use of ozone depleting substances. The threat of 
cancer raised public awareness and generated public support for the ozone layer 
protection regime.58 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety is another example of a strongly science-driven international framework. 
The science–policy interaction in the biodiversity regime is akin to the climate change 
model. However, while the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and 
Technological Advice has been part of the CBD body since the conclusion of the 
convention, the external source of scientific information for the biodiversity regime 
has been established only recently. In 2010, the task of conducting scientific 
assessments of global ecosystems was assigned to the Intergovernmental Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, which functions similarly to the IPCC in the 
international climate regime.59 
In international economic regimes, the role of science is less prominent than in MEAs. 
Unlike in MEAs, where science determines the whole strategy of environmental 
regimes, in international economic regimes, science represents the interests of 
environmental policy and sustainable development, which compete with the purely 
economic interests at the core of these regimes. The WTO Agreement, for instance, 
recognizes sustainable development as an accompanying objective to the overarching 
goal of promotion of trade and economic development.60 Scientific evidence and 
scientific advice are mainly used in the WTO in dispute settlement, particularly in 
judgments about the legitimacy of trade-restrictive measures taken for public health 
and environmental policy reasons under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
                                                 
55 See http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/assessment_panels_main.php 
56 The requests for information are usually contained in decisions of the MOP. The TEAP also prepares 
annual progress reports on technical issues, which are commissioned by the parties. WBCSD-Ecofys 
(2010), p. 43. 
57 Glaser and Bates (2011), p. 9. 
58 Morrisette (1989), pp. 814-820. 
59 See http://www.ipbes.net/about-ipbes.html 
60 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
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and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).61 For instance, an SPS measure, which sets a 
level of protection that is higher than a relevant international standard, must be 
scientifically justified. With respect to a TBT measure, scientific evidence (although 
not required) can be used to assess the risks associated with the non-application of a 
measure. Science is thus used in the WTO to separate legitimate policy objectives 
from measures taken with protectionist intentions.62 Science also guides trade policy 
related to SPS and TBT regulations at a national and regional level,63 and informs 
legislative process in the WTO when it comes to adoption of decisions related to 
public health and the environment.64  
The WTO does not have an internal body charged with assessing scientific 
information or providing scientific advice to the WTO adjudicative and legislative 
bodies. However, a WTO panel adjudicating on SPS measures usually needs to use the 
results of risk assessment to be able to judge whether existing scientific evidence on 
the matter at issue is sufficient to serve as grounds for application of trade-restrictive 
measures.65 In judging such an issue, a panel may seek expertise from scientists, 
including experts from other international organizations and research institutions.66 In 
other words, panels themselves engage in the scientific assessment process.  
Scientific evidence used in WTO disputes is also often characterized by scientific 
uncertainty.67 However, in contrast to MEAs, scientific evidence that a WTO Member 
may use to justify a measure must not necessarily be based on a scientific opinion 
expressed by the majority of scholars in the field, but on an opinion, which is qualified 
and respected.68 
                                                 
61 Scientific evidence also plays a role in disputes involving justification of measures under health and 
environmental exceptions under GATT Art. XX. See Green and Epps (2007), pp. 294-299. 
62 Ibid., p. 286.  
63 The SPS requirement to base a trade measure on scientific evidence limits the policy space for 
national governments as regards measures taken with protectionist purposes. 
64 See, e.g., the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
65 A panel is faced with a need to make a risk assessment when examining a measure on compliance 
with the obligation under SPS Art. 5.1 to base measures on an assessment of the risks to human, animal 
or plant life or health. In the EC-Hormones dispute, for instance, the panel undertook a health risk 
assessment of six cattle growth-stimulating hormones, when it examined the EU ban on imports of meat 
and meat products from cattle, which had been treated with any of those hormones. See 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm 
66 For instance, in the EC-Asbestos case, the panel based its judgments about the French ban on products 
containing asbestos on the findings of the International Agency for Research on Cancer. See Green and 
Epps (2007), p. 296. 
67 Scientific uncertainty was particularly an issue in the famous EC-Biotech case. The US complained 
against the EU’s moratorium on the approval of biotech products (food, feed and fibre), which was 
based on sparse scientific evidence and considerable scientific uncertainty about health effects of 
genetically modified products. Due to the scientific complexity of the issue, the WTO panel 
proceedings were unprecedentedly long lasting three years from 2003 to 2006. The panel ruled against 
the EU measure. However, largely supported by public opinion, the EU decided to keep the measure in 
force and face US trade retaliations. See 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm 
68 EC-Asbestos, AB report, para. 178. 
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All in all, science is an important driver of international policymaking in the field of 
management of risks for human beings and the environment.  However, modes of 
interaction vary from case to case, and depend largely on the regulatory object. 
3.3. Addressing structural and procedural shortcomings  
A fundamental question which needs to be answered is whether the “external scientific 
assessment-internal scientific advice” model is sufficiently effective in advancing the 
UNFCCC objectives. With respect to the reception of scientific input, it might be 
argued that science input to the UNFCCC would be greater if the SBSTA could assess 
scientific information itself and not just collect it from external sources. By only 
gathering information and not assessing it the SBSTA turns into a buffer between 
science and policymaking, hampering and slowing down the effective processing of 
scientific input to decisionmaking.69 Yet, if assessments are made by the SBSTA, 
there is a risk that they will be biased. The SBSTA comprises different government 
delegates, who defend their national interests, whereas one merit of the IPCC 
assessments is that they are made by scientists acting in their own capacity and only 
approved by government delegates at the final stage.70 
It might also be argued that the impact of climate science on international climate 
policymaking could have been much bigger, if countries had agreed at the beginning 
on the IPCC being a forum for negotiating the UNFCCC.71 At the start of international 
climate negotiations, the UNEP, inspired by the success of the ozone layer protection 
regime, intended to copy the Montreal Protocol’s model of direct participation of 
scientists in negotiations for the UNFCCC system. The Montreal Protocol model, 
however, was opposed by some countries in climate negotiations, including the US, 
which were afraid of the far-reaching liberties of scientists in political 
decisionmaking.72  
While the idea of the IPCC becoming a forum for climate policy negotiations has not 
been realized, one question that arises is whether the IPCC can still be incorporated in 
the structure of the UNFCCC. Some may argue that the IPCC is a political body in any 
case and IPCC assessments are reviewed, approved and adopted by national delegates, 
most of whom are also engaged in climate negotiations at the UNFCCC. As mentioned 
above, there is an example of an effective “internal” scientific assessment process 
under the Montreal Protocol. However, the incorporation of a scientific assessment 
body into the UNFCCC structure might not work for the climate change regime. 
Climate science differs from the research on the ozone layer to the extent that climate 
science is much more complex, interdisciplinary and complicated. To ensure 
completeness, impartiality and effectiveness, climate change assessments need to be 
outsourced to an independent external body with its own rules and procedures and an 
established broad network of scientific experts. The political approval of such 
assessments seems also to be more feasible if they are made outside the UNFCCC 
                                                 
69 Lohan (2006), p. 265. 
70 Glaser and Bates (2011), pp. 6-7. 
71 Miller (2004), p. 59. 
72 Ibid., p. 56. 
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political process. The latter holds particularly true given the extension of the scope of 
socioeconomic assessments in AR5.73  
Another important issue related to the processing of science input is the timing of 
SBSTA sessions.74 It might be more effective to hold SBSTA sessions before rather 
than simultaneously with COPs.75 This could give COP delegates enough time to 
process scientific information provided by SBSTA and then use it at COP 
negotiations. 
As regards the scientific input itself, one option would be to hold IPCC sessions in 
advance of COPs or SBSTA meetings.76 This could enable the latest scientific 
information to be processed in time to make it available for use in negotiations. Yet, 
the effect of such changes would likely be limited. The major part of the agenda of 
annual IPCC plenary meetings covers procedural and organizational issues. With 
respect to the substance, annual plenary meetings occasionally deal with small reports 
(special and methodology reports) produced in the period between the issuance of 
assessment reports and independent from the latter. However, the main bulk of 
assessments with the potential to influence the UNFCCC negotiating process are 
delivered in principal assessments reports, which cannot be harmonized with the time 
schedule of policy negotiations as they reflect the irregular pace of scientific 
research.77  
3.4. Improving scientific message 
The experience of climate science-policy interaction over two decades shows a need 
for reinforcing and improving the quality of scientific message. Climate science is 
characterized by considerable uncertainty, which negatively influences the reception 
of scientific messages by policymakers and the public. While uncertainty is an 
inherent part of any scientific research, climate change-related uncertainty is 
politically salient and often used to call into question the credibility of climate 
research results. While there is no doubt that climate change is taking place and is 
mainly caused by human activities, there is uncertainty with respect to the pace of 
climate change and its effects.78 Consequently, there is also uncertainty as to the 
timing and scale of action required to fight climate change, which can serve as an 
excuse for not moving on a global climate deal.  
The next generation of IPCC assessments will certainly contribute to diminishing 
scientific uncertainty. However, it is essential for the effectiveness of scientific input 
                                                 
73 While the contribution of the Working Group III to AR4 consisted of 13 chapters, the one in AR5 is 
planned to have 16 chapters, including equity issues, national and regional policies and international 
cooperation. 
74 On the importance of timing for the uptake of scientific advice by policymakers, see Kohler et al. 
(2012), pp. 74-75. 
75 The simultaneous holding of SBSTA and COP sessions can however be justified by costs saving 
considerations. See Lohan (2006), pp. 308-309. 
76 Lohan (2006), p. 280. 
77 It should be noted, however, that given that the agreed deadline for a post-Kyoto climate deal is 2015, 
IPCC AR5, which is expected in 2014, could provide a timely update of scientific knowledge, which 
could still be taken into consideration at the final stage of drafting an agreement. 
78 Houghton (2009), pp. 262-263. 
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that updated knowledge will duly be taken into consideration by policymakers and 
used as a basis for amendment of the UNFCCC or future climate agreements, as has 
been done with the Montreal Protocol.  
In the meantime, to minimize the negative impact of uncertainty of climate science on 
credibility of its results, IPCC assessments should be accurate in giving statements and 
assigning probabilities to them. Since the preparation of AR4, all three IPCC Working 
Groups have been following common guidelines on the treatment of uncertainty in 
assessments. Scientists working on assessments usually deal with two types of 
uncertainty – “value uncertainty”, when inaccurate data do not allow values to be 
assigned to certain phenomena, and “structural uncertainty”, when, for instance, there 
is a lack of understanding of processes behind climate change or there are 
shortcomings in models.79 “Value uncertainty” is communicated by assigning 
probabilities (likelihoods) based on statistical methods (e.g. “very likely”, which 
corresponds to >90% probability, or “likely”, which corresponds to >66% 
probability).80 “Structural uncertainty” is defined qualitatively by assigning different 
levels of confidence to statements based on the level of evidence and the degree of 
agreement in expert judgements (e.g. “high confidence”, “medium confidence” etc.).81 
Formulating key findings of assessments when evidence is not sufficient or data are 
missing presents a serious challenge for climate researchers. Inaccurate statements 
were a subject of criticism with respect to AR4, particularly the Summary for 
Policymakers written by Working Group II. On one hand, there are statements in the 
Summary that are formulated with high confidence despite being based on little 
evidence.82 On the other hand, there are statements that have little practical value as 
they had to be formulated in very vague terms to be assigned high confidence.83 The 
new guidelines on uncertainty treatment for lead authors of AR5, which have been 
revised to take into account the uncertainty-related inaccuracies of AR4 and the 
recommendations of the InterAcademy Council report, are aimed to increase accuracy 
and credibility of the forthcoming assessments. 
Taking into account the criticism of AR4, it is also necessary to handle properly any 
possible mistakes made in future assessment reports in terms of public 
communication. An important step in this direction has been the recent adoption of the 
protocol for addressing possible errors in IPCC reports.84 The IPCC Secretariat, which 
is designated to be the entry point for all claims of errors, maintains the internal error 
tracking system and works directly with the working group co-chairs to correct 
                                                 
79 See The IPCC Assessments of Climate Change and Uncertainties, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch1s1-6.html#footnote1 
80 For the full range of degrees of likelihood, see Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf 
81 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
82 InterAcademy Council (2010), p. 61. 
83 Ibid., p. 62. 
84 IPCC Protocol for Addressing Possible Errors in IPCC Assessment Reports, Synthesis Reports, 
Special Reports or Methodology Reports, adopted by the Panel at its 33rd Session in Abu Dhabi, 10–13 
May 2011. 
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mistakes (publishing the erratum on the IPCC webpage) and to inform claimants about 
the conclusion of the mistakes handling process.  
An important question is whether IPCC reports should contain recommendations on 
the implementation of the Convention. While policy recommendations may add 
practical value and increase the applicability of scientific assessments, they may also 
call into question the impartiality of scientific research and thus undermine its 
credibility among the UNFCCC parties.85 Yet, without compromising credibility, 
IPCC assessments could provide policymakers with the comparison between climate 
change action and inaction in terms of environmental, economic and social 
implications.86 The choice between action and inaction would still be left to the 
policymakers, but this choice would then be well-informed.  
With a view to increasing policy relevance, and given the complex nature of climate 
change, more weight should be given to conducting interdisciplinary research, which 
would combine research in natural sciences and socioeconomic disciplines. Research 
in socioeconomic disciplines, while being less quantitative, can offer ideas for sound 
policy responses. It is questionable, however, whether the effective combination of 
research in natural sciences with social, political and legal studies is possible. It is 
already difficult to produce interdisciplinary research within the socioeconomic field 
itself, when one attempts, for instance, to supplement economic models with legal 
analysis, to say nothing of adding a natural science dimension. However, scientists 
representing different scientific areas pertinent to climate change need to learn how to 
cooperate and to overcome barriers posed by different terminology and research 
methods.  
Furthermore, more attention should be given to the language in which the scientific 
message is formulated and communicated. In order to be understood and then used in 
policymaking, the language of the scientific message has to be adjusted to be 
understandable by laypeople, as policymakers do not usually have a scientific 
background. It should be noted, however, that considerable progress has already been 
made in this respect, especially as regards the language of scientific message used in 
Summaries for Policymakers of the IPCC reports. Nevertheless, the language can be 
further simplified thus increasing the comprehensibility of the message.87  
 
3.5. Addressing credibility issues of climate science  
Credibility of climate research is another problematic issue of climate science–policy 
interaction. After more than two decades of IPCC activity, climate research is still 
characterized by considerable mistrust among policymakers and the public. As James 
Hansen, director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies recently warned 
“public scepticism about the threat of man-made climate change has increased despite 
                                                 
85 There seems, however, to be no reason for climate science not to advocate certain policy choices. See 
Nelson and Vucetich (2009), p. 1096. 
86 Glaser and Bates (2011), p. 8. 
87 Ibid., p. 12. 
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the growing scientific consensus”.88 This mistrust is particularly strong in developing 
countries89 and countries in transition (CIT). Dealing with the credibility issue requires 
understanding the reasons for mistrust.  
One possible explanation for the existing mistrust of climate science is that “scientific 
judgments … inevitably involve tacit value assumptions and choices that can have 
important social and political consequences”.90 Science implicitly advocates certain 
policy choices.91 Developing countries tend to believe that climate change science 
produced by developed countries promotes the interests of the developed world.92 In 
reality, however, scientific assessments of climate change come into conflict with the 
economic interests of developing countries, most of which rely on fossil fuels in their 
economic growth. Climate science calls for a decrease in the use of fossil fuels and for 
sharing emissions reduction efforts among all countries. The latter is justified by the 
fact that some countries traditionally considered to be developing are not poor any 
longer. Thus, it seems that the credibility problem is to a large extent created 
artificially so that countries retain the possibility for unrestrained economic 
development.93 
There is a close link between credibility of climate science and legitimacy of IPCC 
assessments. However, legitimacy does not seem to be an issue. It can be drawn from 
different aspects of the IPCC assessment process. First, the IPCC is a daughter 
organization of two UN agencies (the WMO and the UNEP) whose governing 
councils exercise supervision over its work, and the establishment of the IPCC was 
approved by the UN General Assembly.94 Second, governments are extensively 
involved in the preparation and approval of assessment reports. The panel, which 
adopts (section by section) overview chapters of methodology reports and longer 
report parts of synthesis reports and approves (line by line) summaries for 
policymakers in the synthesis reports, consists of governmental representatives of 
practically all UN countries.95 This implies a sort of international political 
acknowledgement of summarized scientific evidence of climate change and 
acceptance of the IPCC's work.96 Governments also participate in the process of 
                                                 
88 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/9192494/Climate-scientists-are-
losing-the-public-debate-on-global-warming.html 
89 An exception is small-island developing states, which take seriously the warnings of scientists about 
the risk of inundation of their lands as a consequence of climate change. See Ashe, Lierop and Cherian 
(1999), p. 210. 
90 Miller (2004), p. 59. 
91 Nelson and Vucetich (2009), p. 1092. 
92 Rowe (2009), p. 597.  
93 Rowe, for instance, argues that mistrust of climate science is just used as grounds for not participating 
in the international efforts to fight climate change and for not sharing the costs of such efforts. See 
Rowe (2009), p. 597.  
94 UNGA Resolution A/RES/43/53. The IPCC shares its headquarters with the WMO in Geneva and it 
is sometimes guided in its work (e.g. election of staff) by the General Regulations of the WMO. See 
Yamin and Depledge (2004), pp. 469–470. 
95 Kohler et al. (2012), p. 64. 
96 The IPCC is characterized by universal participation. Currently 195 countries are members of the 
IPCC. Participation in the IPCC is open to all UN, WMO and UNEP members. See Principles 
Governing IPCC Work, para. 7. Summaries for policymakers present “a political-scientific hybrid”; it is 
“a politically negotiated document, but one that retains scientific rigour”. See Yamin and Depledge 
(2004), p. 478. 
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reviewing Working Group assessment reports, sending their comments on each report 
to Working Group/Task Force Bureaus.97 Third, the content of assessment reports is 
defined with inputs from the delegates to the SBSTA, membership of which overlaps 
with that of the UNFCCC. Fourth, IPCC assessments of climate change are mainly 
based on peer-reviewed literature, which attests to their scientific quality and creates 
trust in scientific inferences. Finally, the private sector is also engaged in the 
assessment. In particular, private sector representatives can be nominated and act as 
authors.98  
The current lack of credibility, however, is likely to be the result of an unequal 
contribution of developing country scientists to the IPCC's work. The problem of 
limited participation of developing countries in IPCC assessments was especially acute 
in the first years of the IPCC. To increase the involvement of developing countries, in 
the early 1990s the IPCC introduced some important changes to its institutional 
procedures and structures. It enabled scientists from developing countries to 
participate in IPCC assessments along with scientists from developed nations. 
Representatives of developing countries were included at different management levels 
of the IPCC.99 Furthermore, the IPCC committed itself to a more balanced 
consideration of scientific views of developed and developing countries. Despite these 
changes, however, the IPCC’s scientific expertise is still dominated by scientists from 
developed countries, which is mainly a consequence of the lack of scientific resources 
in developing countries.100 As a result, there is a predominance of “western” views in 
IPCC assessments and assumptions based on modelling of climate systems of the 
North, while the trends in climate systems of the South are often ignored.101  
Apart from the geographical imbalance in the IPCC expertise, there are also some 
flaws in the IPCC assessment and review process, which negatively influence 
credibility and trust. For instance, the current review procedure allows for the same 
comments to be sent from different sources so that an opinion of a scientific minority 
lobbied through multiple channels may gain the biggest weight and eventually be put 
in the assessment report.102 There is also a lack of anonymity, as authors’ names are 
usually known to reviewers, which creates the risk of a biased review of a certain 
author‘s chapters.103 Furthermore, there is insufficient consideration of reviewers’ 
comments by lead authors in final reports. In this respect, the InterAcademy Council 
                                                 
97 See Procedures for the Preparation, Review, Acceptance, Adoption, Approval and Publication of 
IPCC Reports, para. 4.3.4.2. 
98 WBCSD-Ecofys (2010), p. 41. 
99 There are two chairs for each IPCC Working Group and the Task Force, one from a developed 
country and one from a developing one. Members of Working Groups’ and Task Force’s Bureau (and 
eventually the main IPCC Bureau) are equally represented by geographical regions. See Principles 
Governing IPCC Work, para. 5. Teams of coordinating lead authors and lead authors of chapters of 
Working Group assessment reports, which are representative of different geographical regions, include 
scientists from developing countries. See Procedures for the Preparation, Review, Acceptance, 
Adoption, Approval and Publication of IPCC Reports, para. 4.3.2, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-principles/ipcc-principles-appendix-a-final.pdf 
100 Kohler et al. (2012), pp. 71-72. See also Lohan (2006), p. 273, and Miller (2004), p. 63. 
101 Miller (2004), p. 62. 
102 Lohan (2006), p. 273. 
103 Ibid., p. 273. 
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recommended that review editors of IPCC assessment reports prepare written 
summaries of the reviewers’ main comments so that lead authors would be obliged to 
give detailed written feedback on the most important issues raised.104 Another 
important factor in gaining credibility is the sources of scientific information used in 
the assessment process. The use of non-peer-reviewed sources was a point of criticism 
of AR4.105 Therefore, where non-peer-reviewed sources are used, their inclusion needs 
to be warranted and indicated in reports.106  
A necessary step in addressing the credibility problem is increasing the transparency 
of the IPCC assessment process. Scientists working on IPCC assessments must be 
ready to give explanations related to the working process and provide intermediate 
results of assessments in support of final conclusions.107 It is also important to enable 
public access via the Internet to all literature and methodological materials used for 
assessments. The recently established IPCC Executive Committee, working on a 
permanent basis in the period between annual plenary sessions of the IPCC, should 
facilitate continuous communication between scientists and stakeholders 
(policymakers and the public) and enable the rapid and timely reaction of the scientific 
community to criticism related to credibility of IPCC assessments.108  
 
3.6. Increasing public awareness  
The issues of credibility and quality of climate science message are closely linked to 
the issue of public awareness. Public awareness of climate change and its impacts is 
crucial for generating public support for climate policy, which is currently lacking, 
especially in developing countries and CIT.109 Increasing public awareness of human-
induced climate change in developing countries is crucial for ensuring participation of 
these countries in global climate change actions and their cooperation in the formation 
of a post-Kyoto climate regime. The increased awareness of climate change in 
constituencies from developing countries would influence the position of 
representatives of developing countries in international climate negotiations 
facilitating consensus on global climate policy. There is a need to develop global 
                                                 
104 InterAcademy Council (2010), pp. 60-61. 
105 Pursuant to the IPCC procedures on the use of literature, it is allowed to use non-peer-reviewed, 
“grey”, literature (except information from Internet blogs, networking sites, newspapers and broadcast 
media) provided that its quality and validity has been checked and it is made available for storage in the 
IPCC Secretariat. See Annex 2 of Procedures for the Preparation, Review, Acceptance, Adoption, 
Approval and Publication of IPCC Reports.  
106 InterAcademy Council (2010), p. 63. 
107 Glaser and Bates (2011), p. 8. 
108 The IPCC Executive Committee was established on recommendations of the InterAcademy Council. 
It comprises the IPCC Chairs, Working Groups and the Task Group on Inventories Co-Chairs, IPCC 
Vice-Chairs, the Head of Secretariat and four Chairs of Technical Support Units. See “Decisions Taken 
with Respect to the Review of IPCC Processes and Procedures/Governance and Management” IPCC 
33rd Session, 10–13 May, Abu Dhabi.  
109 The position of the public on climate change in developing countries and CITs ranges from 
ignorance and indifference, resulting from the lack of information and poverty concerns, to a complete 
rejection of the phenomenon of climate change as such, supported by climate-sceptical views of local 
scientists and the expectation of positive consequences of climate change. See Luta et al. (2009), p. 12 
and Rowe (2009), p. 593. At the same time, public support has recently started growing due to the 
increased awareness of opportunities that the Kyoto flexible mechanisms (CDM and JI) could offer in 
terms of investment and economic gains. See Andonova and Alexieva (2012 forthcoming), p. 15. 
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strategies of climate change communication, which closely relate to the exercise of 
human rights to freedom of information and expression.110 
The IPCC can play a significant role in the creation of public awareness in developing 
countries. For instance, it could organize workshops and educational courses on 
climate science in developing countries, including training for government delegates. 
However, the problem is the limited financial resources. The IPCC budget is 
composed of the voluntary contributions of participating governments and grants from 
the core budgets of UNEP, WMO and UNFCCC, which are insufficient to support 
extensive outreach activities.111  
Being a major tool of transfer of scientific information to the public, the media play an 
important role in the creation of public awareness about climate change. Given the 
economic, social and political dimensions of climate change and the urgency of policy 
responses, the relationship of climate scientists with the media and the public is crucial 
and even more important than for other areas of science. It is necessary to establish an 
effective interaction between scientists and the media to send the right message at the 
right time to the public and eventually to policymakers. However, this interaction is 
quite tricky. It is the nature of the media to look for sensational stories, which are not 
always important or based on facts.112 Consequently, the scientific opinion that 
receives the most attention from the media is not necessarily the opinion that is 
supported by the majority of scientists. Thus, the interaction between scientists and the 
media requires special skills, especially on part of scientists, who are traditionally not 
used to publicizing their research. The organization of courses on communication with 
the media for scientists could help to build the skills needed. Such courses could be 
organized by the IPCC in various countries with a special focus on developing 
countries and CIT.113 
Although in the end countries tend to interpret the climate science message from the 
position of their national interests, so that the same scientific data are interpreted 
differently by different countries, it is important to consider how scientists’ tacit calls 
for action are presented to the public and policymakers.114 So far, the message coming 
from the international climate science forum has been that climate change is the 
biggest human-induced environmental challenge, rather than being a political or 
economic dilemma, and that climate change is caused by physical properties of 
                                                 
110 Cottier (2012a), p. 154. 
111 The annual budget of the IPCC in 2012 is slightly over 8 million CHF (Swiss franks). Its 
considerable portion goes on supporting the travel of experts to IPCC meetings and support of the work 
of chairs and co-chairs, while outreach activities are only covered by 140,000 CHF. See IPCC-
XXXV/Doc. 2, p.10, http://www.ipcc.ch/meetings/session35/doc2_budget.pdf. 
112 For instance, the email leakage story on the eve of the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference was 
popularized by the media heating up the debate about the credibility of IPCC assessments and 
undermining the support of the public for climate policy. See Glaser and Bates (2011), p. 10. 
113 There is the IPCC fellowship programme for capacity building of developing countries’ scientists 
funded by the Nobel Prize. There is, however, a need for a broader scale of capacity building. See 
InterAcademy Council (2010), p. 67. 
114 Rowe (2009), p. 597.  
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greenhouse gases rather than consumption (moral) failures.115 In other words, 
diplomatic language is important for the transmission of scientific messages to ensure 
trust and cooperation among countries with different interests, social and political 
structures, and historical background.  
4. Conclusions 
Science is at the core of climate policymaking, and IPCC assessments are crucial for 
the progress in building the global climate change regime. We examined key elements 
of climate science–policy interaction, and have come up with a number of suggestions 
for improvement.  
With respect to the procedures, processes and organizational structures of the IPCC 
and the UNFCCC related to the science–policy interaction, there seems to be no need 
for fundamental changes following a series of improvements which have already been 
made upon the recommendation of the 2010 InterAcademy Council report.116 
However, some minor changes are still desirable. They relate particularly to the timing 
of IPCC plenary meetings, which, to generate scientific input at the right time need to 
be held, where possible, before SBSTA and COP sessions, and the timing of SBSTA 
sessions, which, to give sufficient time for input processing, have to precede COPs. In 
general, processes and procedures related to climate science–policy interaction need to 
be reviewed regularly, including monitoring and evaluating the implementation of 
changes.  
As regards scientific messages, the biggest challenge is uncertainty, which can be 
addressed by increasing the accuracy of scientific statements and assigned 
probabilities. Improving the quality of scientific message requires monitoring and 
minimizing the number of mistakes in assessments, and enhancing policy relevance of 
assessments by highlighting consequences of action and inaction, intensifying 
interdisciplinary research and simplifying the language of the scientific message.  
The lack of credibility of climate research is to a large extent a consequence of 
countries’ interests in unrestrained economic development based on the traditional use 
of fossil fuels. Mistrust is also generated by the unequal contribution of developing 
country scientists to the IPCC‘s work, which is a result of the lack of scientific 
resources in developing countries. Nevertheless, credibility of scientific assessments 
can be improved by enhancing transparency of the assessment process, including 
providing open access to information sources and intermediate results, and increasing 
the rigorousness of the review process. 
Public awareness of climate change and its impacts is crucial for generating public 
support for climate change action. As public awareness is lacking, especially in 
developing countries and countries in transition, there is a need to develop strategies 
                                                 
115 Rowe (2009), p. 597 with a reference to Demerrit, D. (2001) ‘The Construction of Global Warming 
and the Politics of Science’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 91, 2, p. 328. There is 
an argument that science is very political. 
116 See Decisions taken with respect to the review of IPCC process and procedures at the 32nd, 33rd and 
34th IPCC sessions. 
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for climate science communication, including public education, training for 
policymakers, and interaction with media. 
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